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Contemporary Dilemmas of the Javins Defense:
A Note on the Need for Procedural Reform in

Landlord-Tenant Law
RICHARD

H. CHUSED*

In the last twenty years, agitation for significant alteration in residential

landlord-tenant law1 has produced a remarkable deluge of decisions permitting residential tenants to raise violations of health and safety codes as

defenses to actions by landlords for possession for nonpayment of rent.2 If the
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; A.B. 1965, Brown University; J.D.
1968, University of Chicago. I am grateful for the assistance of three colleagues, Judith C. Areen, John
Kramer, and Michael Seidman, and my wife, Elizabeth Langer, who read and commented on drafts of this
Note.
1. See Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1279, 1290 (1960) (need exists for
specific legislative changes and application of contract law to contractual provisions of leases); Sax &
Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REv. 869, 875 (1967) (actionable tort for illegal maintenance
of indecent housing conditions against landlords would be more effective than present public enforcement
of housing laws); Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519, 558
(1966) (fundamental revision of antiquated common-law landlord-tenant rules long overdue). See also
Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653, 667 (1957)
(authority exists for extension of implied warranties to situations in which sale has not occurred).
2. Residential implied warranties are certainly the general rule. The principal early reform cases include
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.) (tenant may prove breach of landlord's
warranty of habitability as defense to landlord's suit for possession for nonpayment of rent), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 620, 637, 517 P.2d 1168, 1170, 1182, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704,706,718 (1974) (warranty of habitability implied by law in residential leases; breach of such
warranty may be raised as defense in unlawful detainer action); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 436, 462
P.2d 470, 475-76 (1969) (material breach of implied warranty of habitability justified recission of rental
agreement); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972) (oral or written
contract governing tenancy in multiple-unit dwelling carries implied warranty of habitability fulfilled by
substantial compliance with city building code; this warranty may be raised as an affirmative defense);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796, 798 (Iowa 1972) (trial court must consider defendant's claim of
material breach of implied warranty as defense to landlord's suit for default of rental agreement); Boston
Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843, 845 (Mass. 1973) (breach of implied warranty of
habitability, which may be based on health codes, may be raised as defense to eviction if tenant follows
legislatively mandated procedure); Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 61, 213 N.W.2d 339, 343 (1973)
(breach of statutorily required covenants of habitability may be asserted as a defense in unlawful detainer
actions); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 140, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 531, 535 (1970) (landlord's failure to repair
or replace vital facilities may be raised as equitable defense in dispossess proceeding). Other courts have
very recently followed this trend. See Pugh v. Holmes, 384 A.2d 1234, 1240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (tenant
may assert breach of implied warranty of habitability as defense to landlord's action for possession or
unpaid rent), aff'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 2037, 2038 (Pa. July 6, 1979); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658, 66061 (Tex. 1978) (implied warranty of habitability by landlord in rental of dwelling unit). A growing number
of cases also provide damage remedies to tenants suing landlords for breach of the implied warranty of
habitability. The classic case is Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 467-68, 469, 308 A.2d 17, 21, 22 (1973)
(lessee may sue to recover security deposit or rent when he alleges lessor has broken covenant to maintain
premises in habitable condition). Over half the states have also adopted statutes placing on the landlord the
duty to repair defects arising or discovered during the lease term. Most of the statutes are limited to
residential property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Statutory Note to Chap. 5, at 3a-g (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1974). See also UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.105 (allowing
tenant's counterclaim to landlord's action for possession and rent).
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3
tenant's defense, as exemplified by Javins v. First National Realty Corp., is

successful, relief is provided in the form of a rent abatement. 4 Most courts

have used an implied warranty of habitability as the legal vehicle for allowing

the defense.5 The use of constructive contract theory has been described as the
natural conclusion to centuries of grappling
with the relationship betweeen
6
contract and property in leasehold law.
In this Note I question the continued utility of property-contract analysis

in leasehold possession cases. 7 Rather, I suggest that the solution to the
dilemmas of modem possession cases may be found in civil procedure rules,
not in substantive property or contract concepts.8 I conclude that legislatures
and courts must begin to focus on the reasons justifying summary dispossession of tenants prior to the trial of any defense or counterclaim. Just as courts
of equity routinely decide whether preliminary relief should be granted to a
party claiming potentially harmful consequences during the pendency of
3. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
4. See id. at 1082-83.
5. Early in the development of tenant remedies, some cases held that violations of housing codes
provided tenants with the defense that the lease was an illegal contract. See Brown v. Southall Realty Co.,
237 A.2d 834, 837 (D.C. 1968). This defense, however, appeared to be available only for violations in
existence at the inception of the tenancy. See Saunders v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C.
1968), rev'd on other grounds,Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir) (rejecting
argument that housing code has no effect on lease after it is signed; housing code must be read into housing
contracts), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). The tenant was also obligated to pay the reasonable value of
his possession. See Davis v. Slade, 271 A.2d 412, 414, 416 (D.C. 1970). An explicit rejection of this
illegality theory is found in Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 178-83, 174 N.W.2d 528, 531-33 (1970)
(legislative bodies have indicated intent that housing codes be enforced administratively, not by terms
implied in lease). The illegal contract defense did create an anomalous remedy. If a lease is illegal, why
should a tenant be able to retain possession at a reduced value? The implied warranty of habitability theory,
which leads naturally to a simple damage award, quickly became the judicially favored approach.
6. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970); Kirby, Contract Law and the Form Lease: Can Contract Law Provide the Answer?, 71 Nw. U.L.
REv. 204, 204-05 (1976) (a number of state courts that have implied into residential leases a warranty of
habitability suggest contract law should govern residential landlord-tenant relationship); Lesar, The
Landlord-TenantRelation in Perspective: From Status to Contract and Back in 900 Years?, 9 KANSAS L.
REV. 369, 377 (1961) (landlord-tenant relation has moved from status to contract to property to modern
contract); note 1 supra. But see Siegel, Is the Modern Lease a Contract or a Conveyance?-A Historical
Inquiry,52 J. URB. L. 649, 686, 687 (1975) (lease is neither contract nor conveyance; contract based model
for modern leasing inappropriate).
7. This article focuses primarily on problems associated with suits for possession of leased premises.
There are certainly situations in which the result of a case will differ depending on whether a lease is
perceived as a conveyance of a right to possession or as a contractual relationship. For example, if a tenant
abandons the leased premises, courts have disagreed over the duty of a landlord to mitigate damages before
suing the tenant for rent. Under the traditional rule, the landlord had no duty to mitigate on the theory that
tenants were conveyed a right to possess property for a period of time. As long as the lease was extant, the
landlord could only recover for rent arrears. Conversely, when the possessory rights terminated, the
landlord could obtain his full reward. This caused many landlords to insert clauses in their leases
permitting the premises to be relet for the tenant's account, or to accept routinely the abandonment. These
reasonable business practices led to de facto mitigation in many situations. The recent movement of courts
to require mitigation is, therefore, a fairly minor step and, for purposes of this article, unimportant.
Property-contract disputes such as mitigation have nearly played themselves out. Procedure is the most
important area of review for present day lease law afficionados. For a brief account of the traditional
mitigation rules in actions for rent, see J. TAYLOR, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD

AND TENANT 454-67 (5th ed. Boston 1869) (1st ed. New York 1844). A good discussion of modern
mitigation law may be found in Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 452-59, 378 A.2d 767, 770-74 (1977).
8. See notes 77-84 infra and accompanying text (discussing dispossess statutes).
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litigation, so must landlord-tenant courts confront the possessory rights of
lessor and lessee during the pendency of litigation. Both the summary

dispossess acts adopted in the nineteenth century and the growing number of
Javins-oriented amendments to these outdated statutes 9 should be replaced

with new procedure-oriented legislation.
I. Javins AND

SUCCESSOR CASES: THE CURRENT DILEMMAS

Prior to the thirteenth century the leasehold was viewed as more of a

contract than a conveyance of an interest in land; only later did property

concepts become dominant.10 As originally developed, leases were devices to
guarantee the repayment of loans." By the sixteenth century these basically

contractual loan agreements had given way in England to agricultural
12
leases.

This development both protected the possessor from arbitrary self-

help ejection by the landlord and placed primary responsibility for the care of
the land on the tenant. 13 Industrial development in nineteenth century

England and the United States led to significant alteration in the typical
agrarian leasehold; both commercial and urban leases became heavily laden

with express contractual provisions. 14

The nineteenth century's mixture of possessory and contractual obligations

resulted in a peculiar legal structure. Failure to obey the contractual

obligation to pay rent justified termination of the tenant's possessory interest.
Conversely, a landlord's destruction of the tenant's right of possession
terminated the obligation to pay rent. 15 A breach of other contractual
9. The most prominent statutory scheme is the Uniform Residential Landlordand Tenant Act, which
has now been adopted in 12 states. See 7A U.L.A. 499 (1978). Individual state statutes are also common.
For example, New Jersey has enacted a number of statutes in this area. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-85
(West Supp. 1978-1979) (enabling tenants to deposit rents with court appointed administrator until
dwellings satisfy minimum standards of safety and sanitation); id. §§ 2A:42-10.10 to-10.16 (West Supp.
1978-1979) (forbidding landlord from serving notice to quit or instituting action for possession of premises
if done in reprisal against tenant); id. § 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1978-1979) (forbidding removal of tenants
from residential properties by county district court or superior court except upon established grounds); id.
§§ 46:8-18 to-20.3 (West Supp. 1979-80) (enabling tenants to secure performance of leases through
regulation of security deposits).
10. See 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 221[1] (1977)(summary history of propertycontract tension in landlord-tenant law).
11. Id.
12. A fascinating study of early American landlord-tenant practices may be found in SUNG BOK KIM,
LANDLORD AND TENANT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK (1978).
13. The doctrinal repository for this development was the law of waste. Tenants had an obligation not to
waste the reversionary interest of the landlord. See J. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 249-69; 1 H. TIFFANY, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 109 (1910).
14. See 2 R. POWELL, supra note 10, 222[l], at 178-79.
15. Constructive eviction was an important theory for tenants attempting to avoid rental obligations.
Some tenant reformers in this century sought to modify constructive eviction rules to provide a more
hospitable remedy for lessees. A little progress was made. See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444,
460-61, 251 A.2d 268, 276-77 (1969) (tenant's right to vacate following constructive eviction may be
viewed as stemming from breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment or material breach of implied warranty
against latent defects). Reste provided much of the theoretical underpinning for the later implied warranty
cases. There has also been one successful use of declaratory judgment procedures to obtain prior judicial
sanction for a tenant's departure from leased premises. See Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340
Mass. 124, 129, 163 N.E.2d 4, 7 (1959). Another theory pursued as a tenants' remedy was illegality of
contract. See note 5 supra.
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provisions, however, generally did not affect the rental obligations of either
party. The possessory and contractual remedies were separated, both by the
pre-Field Code pleading systems and by the substantive notion that rental
obligations were legally independent of other contractual provisions. The law
largely, although not completely, 16 treated the lease as two separate documents-a conveyance of land for a price and a contract defining additional
and distinct obligations of the respective owners of the lease term and the
reversionary interest.
This landlord-tenant law was dramatically altered by Javins v. First
NationalRealty Corp.,17 the most lucidly written and frequently cited of the
many opinions that have impled a warranty of habitability into urban
residential leases. First, the court in Javins reaffirmed the once dominant
notion that leases are basically contracts.18 Second, the court found inapplicable to residential leases the most pernicious of the old rules: that the tenant's
obligation to pay rent is independent of any express or implied contractual
duty of the landlord to repair the leased premises. 19 Third, an implied duty to
repair was imposed upon landlords of urban residences. 20 Finally, the local
housing code was deemed to be the appropriate standard for defining the
scope of the implied duty to repair. 21 The court then reversed a judgment for
possession entered against the tenants and remanded the case to landlordtenant 22court for a new trial in which the implied warranty defense could be
raised.
The Javins court listed several familiar reasons for implying a warranty of
habitability into leases covered by the housing code, including lack of tenant
bargaining power, 23 the reliance of tenants on the landlord's greater ability to
inspect and repair the premises, 24 and growth of consumer protection in many
areas of commerce. 25 Despite its heart lifting prose, however, the Javins
opinion has been read in a remarkably narrow manner. District of Columbia
and New Jersey cases provide excellent examples of the national trends.
A. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The Javins decision dealt explicitly only with urban housing.26 District of
Columbia courts have refused to apply the Javins rationale in commercial
lease cases. In Interstate Restaurants, Inc. v. Halsa Corp.,27 the lessee of a
16. Some equitable relief was available to tenants seeking delay of eviction pending resolution of various
disputes. See notes 85-92 infra and accompanying text. In addition, a finding of fraud could alter the
traditional inability of a tenant to offset contract damages against rent. See Dennison v. Grove, 52 N.J.L.
144, 147, 19 A. 186, 187 (1889).
17. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
18. Id. at 1074-75; cf. note 10 supra and accompanying text (leases originally viewed more as contracts
than conveyances).
19. 428 F.2d at 1082.
20. Id. at 1077-81.
21. Id. at 1080-82.
22. Id. at 1082-83.
23. Id. at 1079.
24. Id. at 1078-79.
25. Id. at 1075-76.
26. Id. at 1073.
27. 309 A.2d 108 (D.C. 1973) (per curiam). Holdings on this point in other jurisdictions are scarce. The
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hotel restaurant was denied the right to raise heating, air-conditioning, draft,
and water leak problems in a possessory action brought by the lessor hotel, 28

The court indicated that it was inappropriate "to intrude into established

business practices' 29 in the hotel-restaurant commerce, as delineated in a
negotiated lease."
The court's reasoning in Halsa is unsatisfactory. In some cases, commercial

lessees may have as little bargaining power as typical residential tenants. The
proprietor of a small store who is seeking a lease renewal may be in a

particularly poor negotiating position. If Javins was partially motivated by

concern for tenants who lacked bargaining power, why should business

lessees operating in a tight market automatically be excluded from the
benefits of that decision? Similarly, the belief expressed in Javins that

residential tenants rely on their landlords' greater abilities to inspect and
repair applies with equal force to many commercial lessees. Although reliance

on a landlord's expertise before agreeing to a long-term commercial ground

lease is rare, a tenant operating a small business may depend on the owner's
goodwill and experience. 30 There is no obvious policy reason for providing all
residential tenants an opportunity to delay eviction during litigation of a
housing code defense, while denying the same opportunity to all commercial
31
tenants.
The results in Brown v. Young 32 and Winchester Management Corp. v.

Staten33 are even more disturbing than the result in Halsa. In Brown the
tenants had leased a restaurant from Alfred Greene and Robert Bennett. The

lease included a right of first refusal if the lessors offered the property for

sale.34 In June, 1974, Greene and Bennett sold the property to another party,

in alleged violation of the terms of the lease. 35 The rental agency, however,

continued to accept rent from the tenants without mentioning that the

restaurant had a new owner. 36 In July, 1975, the buyer gave the tenants notice

New Jersey case law, however, might lead to a different result than found in Halsa. Cf Reste Realty Corp.
v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 461, 251 A.2d 268, 276-77 (1969) (constructive eviction from commercial office
may be viewed as stemming from landlord's breach of implied warranty against latent defects); 35 U. PITr.
L. REV. 901, 901 (1974) (examining New Jersey and District of Columbia cases to demonstrate differing
treatment of commercial and residential leases). New Jersey has also imposed good cause eviction
requirements on some commercial landlords. See Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 409, 307 A.2d
598, 603 (1973) (gas station lease and dealer agreement basically a franchise that cannot be terminated by
lessor without good cause), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974). See also Kruvant v. Sunrise Mkt., Inc., 58
N.J. 452, 456, 279 A.2d 104, 106 (per curiam) (refusing to hold that Marini doctrine, which allows tenant
to make necessary repairs and deduct cost from future rents, is inapplicable to commercial leases),
modified, 59 N.J. 330, 333, 282 A.2d 746, 748 (1971) (landlord does not have enforceable judgment for
possession); Demirci v. Bums, 124 N.J. Super. 274, 276, 306 A.2d 468, 469 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973)
(per curiam) (at least some nonresidential tenants may raise equitable defenses such as failure to provide
services required by specific covenant in summary dispossess actions).
28. 309 A.2d at 109 & n.1.
29. Id. at 111.
30. It should be noted that the courts and legislatures have not limited implied warranties of goods to
retail customers. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315.
31. Only an opportunity to delay is provided because most courts require a defending tenant to deposit
rents pending the outcome of the dispossess action. A residential tenant's failure to make whatever deposit
a court requires may terminate the eviction delay. See notes 95-110 infra and accompanying text.
32. 364 A.2d 1171 (D.C. 1976).
33. 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1976).
34. 364 A.2d at 1172.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1171.
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to quit the premises. When they refused to vacate, an action for possession

was commenced in landlord-tenant court. 37 The tenants' attempt to raise the
terms of the lease granting a right of first refusal as a defense failed. The court

was unwilling to permit the breach of a lease provision that was unrelated to
the parties' duties under the housing
code to be raised in a suit for possession
38
based upon a notice to quit.

The Brown decision indicates that neither breach of implied warranty
defenses nor breach of express contract defenses will be available to commercial lessees in landlord-tenant court. By explicitly rejecting the applicability of
Javins to actions for possession based upon notices to quit, the Brown court
implicitly rejected the Javins holdings that leases are contracts and that
possessory and contractual obligations are dependent. 39 Although the tenants

in Brown were forced to pursue their breach of contract case without

possession of the rental property, the court did not analyze why it was
appropriate to deny them possession pending resolution of the contract
dispute.
In Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten,40 residential tenants who were

sued in possession actions for nonpayment of rent claimed that their landlord
had failed to provide hot water and air-conditioning. The District of
Columbia housing codes required the provision of hot water,41 but did not
explicitly require air conditioning. The lease, however, specifically required

the lessor to provide air-conditioning. 42 The court permitted the tenants to

raise only the lack of hot water as a defense to the landlord's action. 43 Despite
Javins, the tenants' obligation to pay rent was in effect held to be independent
44

of the landlord's express agreement to provide air-conditioning.

Read together, Halsa, Winchester, and Brown significantly narrow the

impact of Javins. Of the four-part Javins holding only the two parts implying
into residential leases a warranty of habitability-as defined by the housing
code-have been left intact. The notion that leases are contracts with
37. Id. at 1172. The tenants also filed an action in a court of general jurisdiction seeking various forms of
relief, including a preliminary injunction. The injunction was denied. Id. Although it is certainly possible
that this suit altered the prospects of the landlord-tenant case, the appellate court specifically noted that
equitable defenses such as Brown's were nevertheless properly considered only by a court of general
jurisdiction, not by the landlord-tenant court in a summary action for possession. Id. at 1173. In a
remarkable footnote, the court indicated that the tenants could delay eviction if they claimed legal title, but
not if they claimed equitable title. Id. at 1173 n.3. Why this should be an important distinction was not
discussed. Both Bentham and Field, as leading nineteenth century reformers of law courts, would turn over
in their graves. See notes 92-93 infra and accompanying text.
38. 364 A.2d at 1172.
39. Id. at 1173.
40. 361 A.2d 187 (D.C. 1976).
41. Id. at 189-90.
42. The trial court in Winchester found that the landlords' advertisements for tenants contained
promises of air-conditioning and that these promises were part of the leasehold agreement. That part of the
trial court's decision was not disturbed on appeal. Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, No. L 6521573, slip. op. at 4 (D.C. Super. Ct., Landlord-Tenant Branch, Dec. 6, 1973).
43. 361 A.2d at 187, 189-90, 191.
44. Id. at 190-91. Express contract defense cases do not exist in great number. One interesting contrast
to Winchester is Bullen v. Fellner, 86 Wis. 2d 116, 271 N.W.2d 673 (1978). In Bullen the tenants
successfully argued that the landlord's breach of a contract to repair housing code violations prevented
their eviction. Id. at 121,271 N.W.2d at 675. But cf University Community Properties, Inc. v. Norton, 246
N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1976) (breach of collective bargaining contract obtained by tenants' union not
available defensively in a possession action to those not directly affected by the breach).
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mutually dependent covenants has been discarded. The possibility of implying
warranties on matters not included in the housing codes has also been
eliminated. In practical terms, a summary action for possession of residential
rental property can now be defended in the District of Columbia only on the
grounds that the housing code has been violated, that the service of process or
notice to quit was deficient, or that the action for possession was in retaliation
for tenant efforts to enforce rights under housing codes. 45 In traditional legal
terms, the possessory and contractual aspects of leaseholds are still separate in
all cases except those involving residential tenants living in dwellings with
housing code violations. 46 Javins has turned out to be a narrow break with old
legal theory.
The impact of the Javins decision has been limited in the District of
Columbia for two reasons. First, the District of Columbia Court Reform and
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 shifted most local disputes from the federal
district and circuit courts to the more conservative local District of Columbia
courts. 47 The second and far more important reason, however, is that the rules
of procedure governing the landlord-tenant court provide that defenses may
be raised in possession actions only if the4 defenses involve a request for
"equitable relief related to the premises." 8 Halsa and Winchester were
decided under this rule. 49 The language of the rule is ambiguous. Results
contrary to those in Halsaand Winchester are possible, but not inevitable. The
language "related to the premises" could be construed to refer only to those
defenses closely connected with the expectations of an average tenant.
Implied warranties in a commercial setting, options to renew, and express
agreements to provide air-conditioning in a residence are arguably separate
and distinct from the basic rental agreement. In addition, enforcement of
express contracts historically has been left to courts of law, not equity. Thus,
although the language of the Javins opinion appeared to relegate the
45. See Robinson v. Diamond Hous. Corp., 463 F.2d 853, 857, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (although landlord
withdraws unit from housing market, tenant may assert defense of landlord's retaliatory motive when
served with notice to quit); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (landlord may not evict
in retaliation for tenant's report of housing code violations to authorities), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969).
46. This was explicitly stated in Winchester. See Winchester Management Corp. v. Staten, 361 A.2d at
190.
47. See Pub. L. No. 91-358, §§ 11-721-22, 11-921-23, 84 Stat. 473 (1970).
48. The rule provides as follows:
In actions in this branch for recovery of possession of property in which the basis of recovery
is nonpayment of rent or in which there is joined a claim for recovery of rent in arrears, the
defendant may assert an equitable defense of recoupment or set-off or a counterclaim for a
money judgment based on the payment of rent or on expenditures claimed as credits against
rent or for equitable relief related to the premises. No other counterclaim, whether based on
personal injury or otherwise, may be filed in this branch. This exclusion shall be without
prejudice to the prosecution of such claims in other branches of the court.
D.C. SUPER. CT.R., LANDLORD TENANT BRANCH 5(b).

49. Rule 5(b) explicitly applies only to nonpayment cases. Brown v. Young involved a holdover tenant.
See Brown v. Young, 364 A.2d 1171, 1172 (D.C. 1976). The facts of the Brown case left the court free to
develop a sensible procedural solution to the situation. Instead the court decided the case as if rule 5(b) and
contemporary common law embodied the same basic principles. Although the court in Halsa did not
specifically mention rule 5(b) in its decision, the case clearly was governed by the rule because it was a
nonpayment action.
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distinction between contract and property to the ash heap, the procedural
rules have, in effect, reinvigorated pre-Javinsprinciples. 50
Comparing possession actions with suits for rent highlights the procedural
problems of current landlord-tenant law. Although an express agreement to
provide air-conditioning in a residence may not be "related to the premises"
for purposes of defending a possession action, counterclaims for breach of
such a contract may be freely raised in an action for rent brought in a court of
general jurisdiction. 51 A tenant, although subject to speedy eviction through a
summary dispossess action, may still pursue an affirmative suit in contract in
the regular court. The difference between possession and rent cases raising the
same substantive issues can only be explained by the special procedural needs
of possession cases, not by the historic tension between contract and property
law.
The District of Columbia cases have protected the summary nature of
possession actions by drawing artificial boundaries around Javins. Without
saying so, the courts have effectively limited Javins to enforcement of housing
codes. Although landlord-tenant court may be a viable forum for code
enforcement, 52 there are several reasons for concluding that possession courts
should not be limited to applying only that aspect of the Javins decision. First,
the implied warranty opinions usually do not dwell exclusively on the
implication of a private remedy from statutory enactments. To the contrary,
the post-Javins cases have used housing codes as one possible source for
defining a judicially created common law remedy. Some cases have gone well
beyond the codes in defining the warranty.53 Second, the early implied
warranty opinions focused on the artificiality of separating the obligation to
pay rent from other contractual obligations. The amount of rent may, in
many cases, reflect the value of services or facilities that are much more
luxurious than housing codes require. Although there may be many valid
reasons for implying a warranty for the benefit of the poor, those reasons do
not compel the conclusion that a contract, whether implied or express, should
be unenforceable in possession court. Implication of contracts and availability
of a delay in loss of possession pending litigation of a lease dispute are
completely different issues; judicial linkage of the two is untenable. Third,
multiple litigation may often be a waste of time and effort. In fact, efficiency
50. There is pre-1970 case law that appears to permit any equitable defense to be raised in a possession
action for nonpayment of rent "in order to avoid circuity of action." George Y. Worthington & Son
Management Corp. v. Levy, 204 A.2d 334, 335, 336 (D.C. 1964) (trial court had jurisdiction to determine
fair monthly rent and whether defendant was in default when defendant raised these claims as defenses to
landlord's action for possession).

51. See D.C. R. Civ. P. 13. The District of Columbia court rule governing counterclaims is very similar
to its federal counterpart. See FED. R. CIv. P. 13.
52. It is certainly not the intent of this author to enter into the debate on the utility of housing codes.
Others have dealt extensively with this problem. See Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on
Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Polity, 80 YALE L.J.
1093 (1971); Korpesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of Housing Code
Enforcement and the Poor, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and
Redistribution Policy: A Reply to ProfessorKomesar,83 YALE L.J. 1194 (1973); Markovits, The Distributive
Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirabilitiy of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical
Clarifications,89 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1976). Nor is it my intention to add to the debate on the impact of
the Javins defense on housing quality. See note 95 infra (citing authorities).
53. See Timber Ridge Tounhouse v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. 577, 583, 338 A.2d 21, 24 (Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1975) (mud and water from retaining wall construction rendered patio unusable).
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issues are likely to be more prominient when middle-class tenants are sued for
possession. Such tenants are more likely to know their legal rights and have

legal counsel. To place such tenants on a judicial treadmill, in effect because
they have money, makes little sense. The New Jersey cases are particularly

good vehicles for displaying these points.
B. NEW JERSEY

The New Jersey cases create a set of procedural issues similar to those
raised in the District of Columbia. The string of well known reform
decisions-Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper,5 4 Marini v. Ireland,5 5 and Academy
Spires, Inc. v. Brown 56-accomplished in New Jersey what Javins accomplished in the District of Columbia. The Reste-Marini-Academy Spires path,
however, has been rocky at best. The New Jersey summary dispossess statutes
57
provide that only "jurisdiction" issues may be appealed in possession cases
and that jurisdiction lies in landlord-tenant courts for actions brought after a
"default in the payment of rent." 58 In Marini,the New Jersey Supreme Court
construed the term "default" to include money due, unpaid, and owing, not
just due and unpaid. 59 It further defined "jurisdiction" for appellate purposes
to include defensive allegations of breach of an implied warranty of habitability and found that all rent was due and owing only if the premises were
habitable and fit for living.60 Although these results are laudable, this
statutory construction is defensible only if the modern needs of tenants justify
ignoring the original purposes of the summary dispossess statutes. 61
Subsequent opinions have revealed significant difficulties with the ResteMarini-Academy Spires line of cases. Despite an attempt by the New Jersey
Supreme Court to define explicitly the scope of the implied warranty, 62 judges
54. 53 N.J. 444, 461, 251 A.2d 268, 276-77 (1969) (tenant's right to vacate may stem from breach of
covenant of quiet enjoyment, material failure of consideration or breach of implied warranty against latent
defects).
55. 56 N.J. 130, 140, 144, 146, 265 A.2d 526, 531, 534, 535 (1970). Marini stands for three propositions:
A tenant may raise equitable as well as legal defenses asserting payment or absolution from payment in
whole or in part; there is an implied covenant of habitability in residential leases; and a tenant may make
vital repairs and deduct the cost from future rents if the landlord fails to make repairs.
56. 111 N.J. Super. 477, 484, 268 A.2d 556, 560 (Essex County Ct. 1970) (apartment building tenant
may receive abatement of rent due to landlord's breach of implied warranty of habitability without moving
out of or repairing premises); see Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 469, 308 A.2d 17, 21 (1973) (covenant
to pay rent and covenant to maintain premises in habitable condition are mutually dependent).
57. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59 (West 1952).
58. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53(b) (West Supp. 1978-79).
59. See Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 139, 265 A.2d 526, 531 (1970).
60. Id. at 140, 144, 265 A.2d at 531, 533.
61. See notes 79-84 infra and accompanying text (discussing purpose of summary dispossess statutes).
62. See Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973). In Berzito, the New Jersey Supreme Court,
relying on an Iowa case, found the following considerations pertinent in determining if a breach of the
implied warranty of habitability existed:
1. Has there been a violation of any applicable housing code or building or sanitary
regulations?
2. Is the nature of the deficiency or defect such as to affect a vital facility?
3. What is its potential or actual effect upon safety and sanitation?
4. For what length of time has it persisted?
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are still struggling with the propriety of using possession courts as a forum for
litigating all issues surrounding a landlord-tenant relationship. This difficulty
does not arise simply because some tenant defenses are on the border of
warranty law. Express contract claims also have been difficult for the New
Jersey courts to resolve.
In Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 63 for example, tenants in a
townhouse withheld rent because the promised community swimming pool
and playground had not been completed, and their patio and courtyard were
surrounded by mud running off from construction work on a nearby retaining
wall. 64 The court held that the mud surrounding the house was a serious
defect and that the tenants were "deprived of a substantial attribute" of the
rented premises, justifying use of the implied warranty defense in a possession
case. 65 Despite finding an express contract to provide the swimming pool and
playground, however, the court declined to award a rent abatement for
66
deprivation of the use of the pool and playground in the possession action.
The tenants were forced to seek a contractual remedy in the regular courts. 67
Why relief for breach of an implied contract should be available, while relief
for breach of an express contract should not, was never carefully discussed.
From a purely contractual perspective, the difference is obtuse. It may, in
fact, be more important to permit defenses based on actual rather than
constructive agreements. If, as in Dietz, the tenants have agreed to high rental
fees, 68 why should they not be entitled to all the possessory rights for which
they have paid? To the extent that the implied warranty theory connotes a
general coalescence of contract and property theory in landlord-tenant law, it
is anomalous to maintain separate forums for express contract and possession
cases.
Two plausible explanations for the Timber Ridge outcome appear in the
opinion. First, it is arguable that swimming pools and playgrounds are
factually distinguishable from mud, even if express and implied contract
defenses are, as a procedural matter, similarly treated. The swimming pool
and playground were physically distant from the residence, not mentioned in
the housing codes, and unrelated to habitability. The contract to provide these
facilities was arguably separate from the leasehold arrangements. The mud,
on the other hand, surrounded the tenants' house, made ingress and egress
difficult, destroyed the use of the patio, and severely affected only this
5.
6.
7.
8.

What is the age of the structure?
What is the amount of the rent?
Can the tenant be said to have waived the defect or be estopped from complaining?
Was the tenant in any way responsible for the defective condition?

Id. at 470, 308 A.2d at 22 (citing Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Iowa 1973)). As the text
demonstrates, this list is not very helpful. For another "fringe" implied warranty case in which tenants
claimed noise from a neighbor's apartment created habitability problems, see Millbridge Apartments v.
Linden, 151 N.J. Super. 168, 376 A.2d 611 (Camden County Ct. 1971). The court agreed that repeated
loud noise that could be stopped by the landlord could be a defense to a dispossess action, but found that
the defendants in this action were not entitled to an abatement. Id. at 173, 376 A.2d at 614.
63. 133 N.J. Super. 577, 338 A.2d 21 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
64. Id. at 579, 338 A.2d at 22.
65. Id. at 580-81, 338 A.2d at22-23.
66. Id. at 585, 338 A.2d at 25.
67. Id. at 584-86, 338 A.2d at25.
68. Id. at 583, 584, 338 A.2d at 24.

1979]

1395

LANDLORD-TENANT REFORM

particular residence. 69 The court found that it caused "very special and
individualized harm. . with respect to the exterior habitability of. . . [the
tenants'] premises." 70 Second, the court noted that "[w]here the living vitality

of the rented facility and its immediate environs is not specially affected by
the failure to perform, the court believes tenants' remedy, individually or in

combination with other similarly aggrieved tenants, would be best handled in
a more conventional legal proceeding." 71 It deemed the possession action to

of disputes about express
be an inappropriate forum for the resolution
72
promises to provide "social amenities."

The court's explanations are unacceptable. If, as the court admitted, the
promise of a swimming pool and playground was a "substantial inducement

offered by the landlord to procure the rental agreement,

' 73 why

should the

portion of the rent attributable to these facilities be "due and owing" under
the default provisions of the New Jersey summary dispossess statutes? 74 If the
procedural statutes are to be rationally construed, a landlord's breach of an

implied warranty of habitability may not be the only logical basis for

defending a possession action. In Dietz, the court in effect decided that the
tenants had taken the wrong procedural path; rather than raising as a defense

in the summary dispossess action the lessor's failure to provide a playground
and swimming pool, the tenants should have filed a separate contract action

and then moved to transfer the landlord's possession action from landlordtenant court to a regular civil forum and to consolidate the possession and
contract actions. 75 Because the Dietz case was successfully transferred, 76 there
is little reason to believe that a consolidation motion, if made, would have

been denied. Only prejudice to the landlord would have justified a refusal to
69. Id. at 580, 338 A.2d at 22-23.
70. Id. at 585, 338 A.2d at 25.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 584, 338 A.2d at 25.
74. An interesting comparison to Timber Ridge is provided by University Court v. Mahasin, 400 A.2d
133 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (per curiam). In University Court the court affirmed a decision
holding that when the lease expressly provides for it, a landlord can demand as part of rent "due and
owing" a reasonable counsel fee for bringing a dispossess action. Id. at 134. If this result is correct, why
should a tenant be forbidden to claim that rent is not due and owing if the landlord breaches an express
contract to provide a service?
75. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-60 (West 1952) (New Jersey transfer statute). For other interesting
transfer cases, see Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 405, 307 A.2d 598, 600 (1973) (landlord's
dispossess action consolidated with tenant's suit for injunction and reformation of franchise agreement and
transferred to superior court), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974); Morrocco v. Felton, 112 N.J. Super. 226,
233, 270 A.2d 739, 742 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970) (when court must determine legal rights of parties in
important, undefined area of law, removal from county district court to superior court warranted);
Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395, 403, 404, 261 A.2d 413, 417 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1970) (because county district court had jurisdiction to consider lack of habitability in summary action for
possession and transfer sought to avoid rule forbidding joinder, counterclaim, or third-party complaint in
such a summary action, transfer to superior court not merited). Academy Spires v. Jones involved the same
dispute considered in Academy Spires v. Brown. See Academy Spires v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 480,
268 A.2d 556, 558 (Essex County Ct. 1970) (landlord failed to provide lighting for parking lot in violation
of local housing ordinance, and failed to provide essential service, rendering apartment uninhabitable). The
court in Jones declined transfer on the ground that landlord-tenant court could consider the equitable
defenses being raised. But see Morrocco v. Felton, 112 N.J. Super. at 233, 270 A.2d at 742-43 (Jones must
be reexamined in light of Marini v. Ireland).
76. See Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. at 578-79, 338 A.2d at 22.
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consolidate. Furthermore, because the defense stemming from the run-off of
mud was already available to the Dietzs in the transferee court, good reasons
existed to try all issues at the same time. The swimming pool defense involved
many similar facts, required the production of no additional witnesses, and
would have added little time to the trial. The procedural inefficiencies caused
by the court's decision, together with the anomalous independence of the
express contractual provisions of a lease from the obligation to pay rent,
strongly indicate the need for substantial procedural changes in the New
Jersey summary dispossess statutes.
II.

THE DISPOSSESS FORUM AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION LAW

A. THE ROLE OF SUMMARY DISPOSSESS STATUTES

It is ironic that modem landlord-tenant literature continues to focus on the
contract-property tension in the law of leases. As Professor Siegel points out,
the "reintroduction" of contract principles into lease analysis may be causing
nothing more than the demise of contract principles introduced into landlordtenant law in the last century.77 But the irony runs deeper; concentration on
contract or property law misses the primary problem. In most jurisdictions,
neither the post-Civil War revolution in civil procedure under the Field Codes
nor the post-depression reforms under state analogs to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure significantly altered the operation of summary eviction
courts. As the District of Columbia and New Jersey cases demonstrate, courts
have been forced to run an obstacle course created by local summary78eviction
laws when attempting to deal sensibly with landlord-tenant cases.
Summary dispossess statutes were passed to provide landlords with a
speedy method by which to recover the possession of property. 79 Self-help
reentry, distress, and ejectment were thought to provide inadequate relief for
early nineteenth century landlords who sought possession from nonpaying or
holdover tenants. Although landlords were free to evict tenants through self77. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 650.
78. See notes 26-76 supra and accompanying text. Illinois provides another perfect example of this
problem. In that state, only defenses "germane to the distinctive purpose" of the summary dispossess statue
may be raised. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 57, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1972). The Illinois state courts have
developed some interesting constructions of this phrase. See Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 358,
280 N.E.2d 208, 213 (1972) (whether rent is due is not only germane, but decisive when asserted right to
possession based on nonpayment of rent); Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 46 Ill. 2d 249, 256, 257, 263 N.E.2d
833, 838 (1970) (defenses based on validity of contracts for sale of land germane to distinctive purpose of
forcible entry and detainer actions; equitable defenses may be pleaded), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 928
(1971). A lower Illinois court has found that an express covenant defense was germane to the purpose of
the summary dispossess statute. See South Austin Realty Ass'n v. Sombright, 47 I11.App. 3d 89, 94, 361
N.E.2d 795, 798 (1977). The state supreme court, however, has not yet decided this issue.
79. Source material on summary dispossess statutes and related matters may be found in 2 R. POWELL,
supra note 10, 250, at 372.126-.128; J. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 418-54 (remedy of distress for rent), 51552 (remedies of ejectment and summary proceedings); and 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 13, §§ 272-89, at
1716-1817. Cf. McGann v. La Brecque Co., 91 N.J. Eq. 307, 308-11, 109 A. 501, 501-02 (1920) (history of
adoption of New Jersey summary dispossess statute). See generally Comment, Defects in the Current
Forcible Entry and DetainerLaws of the United States and England, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1067 (1978)
(discussing history and drawbacks of present forcible entry and detainer laws).
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help action, use of force sometimes led to damage suits and restitution of the
premises to the evicted tenant.80 There was thus some financial and physical
risk associated with the use of the remedy.81 Although a simple lockout would
not violate the forcible entry and detainer statutes, more strenuous efforts
might do so. The remedy of distress, by which the landlord seized from the
rented premises the personal property of the tenant, provided some monetary
relief for nonpayment of rent, but did not terminate possession.82 Moreover,
because the remedy could produce property less valuable than the rent due or
fail to convince the tenant to pay rent on time, the landlord could be left with
a nonpaying tenant still in possession. Ejectment also provided little effective
relief because it was a slow, technical process. For example, common law
ejectment generally was available against a tenant who breached a rental
covenant only if the lease provided for a right of reentry.83 Without such a
reservation, which was rarely found in oral leases, the landlord was required
to wait until the conclusion of the term to obtain possession.
Summary dispossess statutes filled these gaps by guaranteeing a speedy
judicial resolution of possession disputes and by diminishing the need to rely
on self-help procedures for relief. Although the statutes often provided for a
separate cause of action for damages against a landlord who wrongfully
brought a dispossess action,84 the likelihood of a tenant obtaining such an
award was significantly reduced by the early involvement of the court in the
summary dispossess process.
Speedy resolution of possessory disputes is still often in the landlord's best
interest. The recent introduction of the implied warranty and other defenses
into the traditional action for possession may delay significantly the final
resolution of a dispute. These developments have caused a significant conflict
between the landlord's need for rental income and the tenant's desire for a
forum to resolve disputes before loss of possession. To date, courts have had
difficulty defining situations in which a tenant should be able to delay eviction
by introducing new matter into the proceeding.
B. EQUITABLE INTERVENTION IN SUMMARY DISPOSSESS PROCEEDINGS

A partial answer to the difficulties present in contemporary landlordtenant proceedings may lie in injunction cases decided in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Although the purpose of the summary
dispossess statutes was to provide a speedy possession remedy to lessors, a
number of equity courts intervened in dispossess actions to provide tenants
80. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:39-1 (West Supp. 1979) (prohibiting entry into residences unless made
pursuant to legal process); id. § 2A:39-8 (West Supp. 1979) (plaintiff recovering judgment under forcible
entry and detainer chapter entitled to damages and possession of the real property); 23 LEWINE, NEW
JERSEY PRACTICE § 2481, at 230 (1962)(review of statutes giving remedy against person entering and
detaining real estate by force).
81. See Thiel v. Bull's Ferry Land Co., 58 N.J.L. 212, 215, 33 A. 281, 282 (1895) (person in peaceable
occupation of realty may not be forcibly evicted even if lease by which occupier held land was terminated).
82. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:33-1 (West Supp. 1979) (authorizing reasonable distraint except in cases
involving residential tenants). The statute authorizing distress for rents by landlords was found
unconstitutional by an intermediate New Jersey court in Van Ness Indus. v. Claremont Painting &
Decorating Co., 129 N.J. Super. 507, 515, 324 A.2d 102, 106 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974).
83. See J. TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 517.
84. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59 (West 1952 & Supp. 1978-79).
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with a forum for various equitable claims. Some jurisdictions permitted a
party in possession claiming title to the property to shift his dispute to courts

of equity without losing possession prior to judgment.8 5 In many states, title
disputes actually became a statutory exception to the jurisdiction of summary

dispossess courts. In addition, some courts of equity asserted the right to
86
delay the landlord's recovery of possession when tenants claimed fraud,

breach of lease renewal clauses,87 inequitable forfeitures,88 or estoppel.89
85. Generally, having once recognized their landlord's title by agreeing to the lease, tenants were
estopped from pleading in any action at law or equity that they had title superior to that of their landlord.
See W. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS IN EQUITY

*24; J.

TAYLOR,

supra note 7, at 521-22; 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 13, § 277, at 1778. A tenant could plead his landlord's
title after possession had begun, however, by alleging that the petitioner in the action was not, in fact, the
landlord. See 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 13, § 277, at 1779. In addition, by the early twentieth century
many jurisdictions had adopted statutes either transferring title dispute litigation to courts of general
jurisdiction or limiting summary dispossess courts to disputes between landlords and tenants. See D.C.
CODE ENCYCL. § 45-914 (West 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-52 (West Supp. 1978-79). Some case law
also developed in support of the notion that summary dispossess or ejectment actions could be delayed by
possessor's claims of equitable title. See Boole v. Johnson, 11 Del. Ch. 364, 366, 102 A. 782, 783 (1917)
(equity will interfere in ejectment suit when equitable title is set up as a defense against holder of legal title);
Porter v. Meigs, 74 So. 2d 82, 85 (Fla. 1954) (determination of which party has paramount title and right of
possession can be fairly determined in ejectment action); Crawford v. Smith, 151 Ga. 18, 20, 105 S.E. 477,
478 (1921) (defendant in ejectment action may obtain equitable relief when title to land transferred by
plaintiff to his wife in colorable transaction); Lott v. Lott, 146 Mich. 580, 583, 109 N.W. 1126, 1127 (1906)
(in absence of homestead interest, defendant in ejectment suit had legal title to land and must prevail in
ejectment action); Mathis v. Campbell, 117 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tenn. App. 1938) (chancery court had
jurisdiction under ejectment bill to inquire into and settle title); cf. Heller v. Jentzsch, 303 Mo. 440, 440,
260 S.W. 979, 979 (1924) (unlawful detainer action consolidated with suit seeking specific performance of
contract to convey land and injunction against prosecution of unlawful detainer action).
86. See 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 13, § 288, at 1814-15 & n.586 and sources cited therein.
87. See Winestine v. Rose Cloak & Suit Co., 93 Conn. 633, 638-39, 107 A. 500, 501-02 (1919) (summary
process may be enjoined when landlord has attempted to prevent tenant from exercising right of renewal
and tenant has expended large sums believing landlord would not prevent renewal); Shaw Bros. Oil Co. v.
Parrish, 99 So. 2d 610, 613 (Fla. 1958) (injunction against eviction proceedings proper when lessee relied
on renewal covenant and could not be adequately compensated except by renewal of the lease); Hobbs v.
Chamberlain, 55 Fla. 661, 661, 664, 45 So. 988, 989, 990 (1908) (reversing on procedural grounds
dissolution of injunction restraining summary proceedings against tenants who had expended large
amounts of money in reliance on renewal right provided for in lease); cf. Sambataro v. Caffo, 20 F.2d 276,
277 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (equity court may grant specific performance requiring lessor to execute lease renewal
and need not defer action until lessor has brought ejectment action); City Garage & Sales Co. v. Ballenger,
214 Ala. 516, 518, 108 So. 257, 259 (1926) (lessee entitled to specific performance of renewal agreement
and incident to this is entitled to enjoin lessor's unlawful detainer suit); Blount v. Connolly, 110 Mo. App.
603, 608, 85 S.W. 605, 606 (1905) (bill of equity to compel landlords to perform renewal covenant and
enjoin prosecution of unlawful detainer suit properly brought). See also Goldberg's Corp. v. Goldberg
Realty & Inv. Co., 134 N.J. Eq. 415, 422, 426, 36 A.2d 122, 126, 128 (1944) (renewal right does not vest
until lessee complies with lease conditions; here lessee rejected option; preliminary injunction modified to
allow landlords to institute action for possession). There are also cases holding that because the agreement
to renew the lease could be raised as a defense in the possession action, the tenants had no standing to bring
an equitable action. See Donart v. Stewart, 61 Or. 396, 398, 122 P. 763, 764 (1912) (forcible entry and
detainer action); Bard v. Jones, 96 Ill. App. 370, 373 (1901) (forcible detainer action).
88. Bartelstein v. Goodman, 340 Ill. App. 51, 57, 90 N.E.2d 796, 799 (1950) (plaintiff could invoke
jurisdiction of court of equity, rather than assert equitable defense in forcible detainer action, to prevent
forfeiture of lease); see Westfield Airport, Inc. v. Middlesex-Union Airport Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 263, 269, 54
A.2d 204, 208 (1947) (injunction to restrain prosecution of ejectment action will be granted when equitable
defense or right such as forfeiture is involved; because agreement here creating limitation of term of lease is
not an equitable defense or right, injunction denied), affd mem., 141 N.J. Eq. 365, 57 A.2d 383 (1948).
89. See First Lutheran Church v. Rooks Creek Evangelical Lutheran Church, 316 Il. 196, 202, 147
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Although a tenant could not routinely delay a dispossess action by requesting

a preliminary injunction, the summary dispossess forum was not treated as a
completely insular institution. When a tenant met the requirements for

obtaining a preliminary injunction against the landlord's eviction efforts,

courts would occasionally act to ameliorate the harshness of the speedy

eviction process. 90 Even today, courts may use their equitable powers to

prohibit the landlord's use of the summary dispossess remedy. 9 1
The view that the nineteenth century tenant was unable to delay eviction
because of the denial of most defenses in summary dispossess cases must

therefore be colored by the willingness of some equity courts to intervene. The
recent introduction of habitability defenses into landlord-tenant court serves a

function similar to that performed by the old equity law. Nonetheless,
equitable defenses other than the narrow claims permitted by cases such as
Javins are rejected without much thought, 92 and tenants' requests for damages
or injunctive relief are often relegated to other forums. The resulting paper

chase may be a lawyer's delight, but it is hardly an efficient method of
resolving possession disputes. The artificial procedural boundaries of present
law should be abolished, and replaced with a general rule permitting tenants
to delay eviction when they are eligible for the equivalent of preliminary
injunctive relief.
In essence, this reform would demand no greater change in landlord-tenant

court procedure than was effected in the nineteenth century courts of law

through the efforts of such reformers as Bentham and Field. 93 Although the
merger of law and equity ended most occasions for the issuance of injunctions
against proceedings at law, landlord-tenant actions still present forum
conflicts. The logical response to this procedural conflict is to remove the
94

artificial limitations on the types of issues that possession courts may hear.

N.E. 53, 56 (1925) (plaintiff in ejectment suit estopped from any claim to recover premises; ejectment suit
should be enjoined until rights of plaintiff in equitable action determined); Westfield Airport, Inc. v.
Middlesex-Union Airport Co., Inc., 140 N.J. Eq. 263, 269, 54 A.2d 204, 208 (1947) (only when equitable
right or defense such as estoppel is involved and there is no adequate remedy at law will court of equity
restrain prosecution of ejectment action), affd mem., 141 N.J. Eq. 365, 57 A.2d 383 (1948).
90. The history of equitable intervention in New York state is nicely summarized in Horton v. Roy, 116
Misc. 707, 709-10, 190 N.Y.S. 454, 455-56 (Sup. Ct. 1921). The Horton court also noted the general
unwillingness of equity to act when the remedy at law was adequate. See id. at 710-11, 190 N.Y.S. at 45657; accord, e.g., Alpert v. Peloquin, 96 Conn. 626, 630, 115 A. 81, 82 (1921); City of Grand Rapids v.
Central Land Co., 294 Mich. 103, 112, 292 N.W. 579, 583 (1940); Crest Drug Store, Inc. v. Levine, 142
N.J. Eq. 652, 656, 61 A.2d 190, 192 (1948).
91. See Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598, 600 (1973) (landlord's summary
dispossess action consolidated with tenant's chancery suit to enjoin landlord from terminating lease and
dealer agreement), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974).
92. See notes 26-76 supra and accompanying text (discussing District of Columbia and New Jersey cases
limiting impact of early landlord-tenant reform decisions).
93. A summary of the English reforms may be found in 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 402-17 (1914). The American analog is described in L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
340-58 (1973).
94. The creation of unified housing courts in some jurisdictions has resulted in some progress in the
reform of eviction procedures. Some of these new courts have virtually complete jurisdictional and
procedural authority in landlord-tenant disputes. See ABA SPECIAL COMMISSION ON HOUSING & URBAN
DEVELOPMENT LAW, URBAN HOUSING COURTS & LANDLORD-TENANT JUSTICE: NATIONAL MODELS

AND EXPERIENCE (1977); Nebron & Ides, Landlord Tenant Court in Los Angeles: Restructuring the Justice
System, 11 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 538 (1978); Comment, Housing Abandonment and the Courts:An Innovative
Approach to Housing Court Reform, 21 ST. Louis L.J. 795 (1978). The growing trend to create housing
courts with complete jurisdictional and procedural powers confirms the validity of the thesis of this article.
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By treating these courts as courts of general jurisdiction, a tenant would not
need to file a separate case in another forum and then file motions to
preliminarily enjoin the landlord's action and to consolidate it with his newly
filed case in the possession action. Instead, the tenant would simply file an
answer and move to preserve possession pending final determination of the
case. At the motion hearing the relation between possession and the tenant's
defenses would be analyzed, and the need for speedy resolution would be
investigated.
C. THE LESSEE'S RIGHT TO RETAIN POSSESSION PENDING RESOLUTION OF
AN ACTION FOR POSSESSION

The habitability defenses now available in most landlord-tenant courts do
not always prevent eviction pending resolution of the litigation. 95 Appellate
tribunals routinely have suggested that summary dispossess courts may
condition a delay of the eviction process on the deposit of rents into the
court. 96 This suggestion has generally been made as if the notion of rent
deposits was an obvious consequence of Javins. Only the courts in the District
of Columbia have analyzed the problem with much care. Beginning with Bell
v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 97 the District of Columbia Circuit has taken the
unique position that landlords should not expect to obtain routinely the
benefits of protective orders, which is the local term for deposit decrees,
during the pendency of dispossess actions. The court in Tsintolas noted that
civil litigants rarely obtain judicial intervention designed to guarantee the
solvency of their opposition 98 and that protective orders may indirectly
restrict the tenant's right to proceed in forma pauperis. 99 Despite the delays in
the summary process caused by tenants' expanded rights, 100 those considerations justified protective orders only when the landlord showed "obvious
need."

10

'

95. Tenants, of course, often fail to raise a defense for reasons that include tenants' ignorance and their
lack of legal counsel. See Mosier & Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court, Miniscule Results: A
Study of Detroit'sLandlord-Tenant Court, 7 J.L. REF. 8, 42-45, 62 (1973); Note, The Great Green Hope:
The Implied Warranty of Habitabilityin Practice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 729, 739-40, 776 (1976). But see
Heskin, The Warranty of HabitabilityDebate: A California Case Study, 66 CAL. L. REV. 37, 57 (1978)
(although tenants have little specific knowledge of the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability, most
realize they may withhold rent when landlord fails to maintain rental property). This article is concerned
with those situations in which a tenant does raise a defense.
96. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty, 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 n.67 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 637, 517 P.2d 1168, 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 718 (1974);
Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 61, 213 N.W.2d 339, 343 (1973); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 147, 265
A.2d 526, 535 (1970).
97. 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see Blanks v. Fowler, 459 F.2d 1282, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(upholding court order that tenant make monthly deposits into court pending trial); Cooks v. Fowler, 459
F.2d 1269, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (when landlord entitled to definite part of in-court fund and demonstrates
dire need for it, court may, in exercise of its equitable powers, disburse deposited fund pendente lite).
98. Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d at 479.
99. Id. at 479-80,481.
100. Id. at 481-82.
101. Id. at 483-84. The court also held that a protective order may only require the tenant to pay future
rent into the court, not amounts alleged to be due prior to the filing of the law suit. Id. at 483. This result,
the court noted, was dictated by local law. Under District of Columbia law a landlord may not routinely
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Taking some liberty with the actual result, it is fair to say that the Tsintolas
opinion is in the mainstream of jurisprudence in which the litigants' needs are
carefully balanced before a preliminary injunction is issued or a bond is
required as a condition to preliminary equitable relief. 02 Tsintolas could be
both a possible solution to the problems caused landlords by delays in
summary dispossess proceedings and an indication that any attempt to move
possession actions into regular civil forums will raise a new series of questions
about the law of leases. If there is substance to my suggestion that a wide
variety of defenses and counterclaims should be routinely pleadable in
possession actions, future courts must focus on when eviction may be delayed
and what security must be posted to obtain the delay.
Title disputes 10 3 provide a convenient arena in which to analyze my
conclusions that the substantive nature of the dispute before a possession
court should not govern the pleading process and that summary possession
court judges should decide at an early stage of the litigation the circumstances
under which a possessor may remain on the premises until judgment. 104 In
many jurisdictions, a tenant alleging title to the leased premises may often
avoid immediate eviction by transforming the proceeding into the equivalent
of an action to quiet title. As previously mentioned, a number of early
twentieth century courts and legislatures concluded that summary dispossession of a tenant claiming title was inappropriate. It could be just as easily
argued, however, that the landlord who is claiming the reversionary interest is
entitled to access to the property on breach of the lease. Similarly, one could
contend either that a Tsintolas protective order is inappropriate when a tenant

claims there is no obligation to pay rent, or that a rent deposit is necessary to
secure the rights of the reversionary claimant.
These conflicting views may best be resolved by invoking the procedural
norml 05 that the order in which the pleadings are filed should not determine

merge rent and possession actions. Id. Service of process rules are more stringent in rent cases than in pure
possession cases. Id. at 477. The court's rationale is weak; if the court wants to avoid judicial bill collecting
in circumstances in which procedural obstacles preclude the merger of rent and possession cases, why does
it require rent deposits at all? Why should a landlord be forced to try a possession action involving a
habitability issue only to obtain possession later because the tenant is unable to pay even an abated rent? If
the rent has been withheld for a long period of time without the landlord taking any action, access to a
protective order arguably has been waived. If the rent is recently due, however, why not compel the tenant
to deposit some of it?
102. Cf id. at 484-85 (discussing considerations trial court must weigh in determining if and to what
degree deposit will be required). The best recent article on preliminary injunctions is Leubsdorf, The
Standard For PreliminaryInjunctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1978). For discussion of bonds see Dobbs,
Should Security be Required as a Pre-Condition to Provisional Injunctive Relief?, 52 N.C. L. REV. 1091
(1974) and Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 HARV. L. REV. 333 (1959).
103. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
104. Security may also pose a problem if the tenant wishes to retain possession pending appeal. Bond
statutes requiring the posting on appeal of double the rent value of the premises have been held
unconstitutional. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 79 (1972). More rational security systems, however,
may survive constitutional challenge. The appellate security system must also take into account the
outcome of the trial court process. If, for example, the tenant won an abatement below, the court should
require deposit of only the abated rent. This is the tenor of the District of Columbia cases. See Cooks v.
Fowler, 459 F.2d 1269, 1273-75 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (protective order that requires tenant to deposit more than
landlord could claim is unsupportable; deposit less than rent due desirable when tenant makes very strong
showing dwelling is in violation of housing regulation norms).
105. It is certainly true that the order in which pleadings are filed may have an impact on the outcome of
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the substantive outcome of the case. Both parties, knowing of the potential
title claim, could file actions to quiet title. Similarly, property relationships

during the pendency of a landlord-tenant proceeding should be the same
whether a landlord's action for possession or a tenant's suit for breach of
contract to provide an air-conditioner, for example, is filed first. This simple
observation is a natural consequence of the position that possession courts be
absorbed into contemporary civil forums. It is fair to suggest, however, that
today these two cases might be handled differently in many jurisdictions.
Although it is unlikely that the tenant suing first on the air-conditioning
contract would lose possession before judgment, a landlord winning the race
to the courthouse may well gain possession summarily. 06
Resolution of the interim procedural battles requires use of rules other than
those applicable to the game of courthouse racing. Preliminary injunction law
provides a useful, if not compelling, analogy. Professor Leubsdorf suggests
that "[tlhe danger of incorrect preliminary assessment is the key to the
analysis of interlocutory relief."' 107 In particular, it is the "harm [from an
interim order] that final relief cannot redress"'108 that is key. In the title cases
landlords want both title to their reversion and rent for the periods of
occupancy. If the possessors may continue their occupancy during the

proceedings without paying rent into the court, the landlords may lose their

interim rent and the value of its use as a result of the litigation even if they

eventually win their cases. The tenants, on the other hand, want title. If the
tenants lose possession during the litigation but later prevail on the title issue,

they will lose the market value of possession and incur moving or other

consequential costs. Both the landlords' and the tenants' potential costs can
be significantly minimized by allowing the tenants to stay in possession under
a protective order with the deposited money drawing interest. Another course
of action should be taken only if the likelihood of one side prevailing on the
merits is high. 09
a case. For example, the party filing a complaint often has a great deal of discretion in picking a forum. The
substantive outcome of a case, however, should not turn on the pleading system. Much of civil procedure
law is devoted to protecting the party responding to a complaint from loss simply because of his status as a
defendant. Although there are certainly limits on the degree to which a defendant may expand the scope of
any particular litigation, there is general agreement that all matters arising out of the same set of facts
should be litigated in one place.
106. A landlord suing first for possession would have the advantage of the summary dispossess forum.
Speedy eviction is the norm unless the tenant can plead a Javins defense. A tenant suing in contract before
his landlord takes any legal action, however, can use two tactics to avoid loss of possession if the landlord
subsequently files an action in landlord-tenant court: First, the tenant can plead that the eviction action
was retaliatory and ask for a delay in the possession case; second, he or she can simply ask the court of
general jurisdiction trying the contract case to accept a rent deposit and request that the court merge the
possession action with the contract case. As a general proposition, rent deposits should be appropriate no
matter who sues first, because in either case a certain portion of rent will usually be in dispute.
107. Leubsdorf, supra note 102, at 541.
108. Id.
109. Most possession disputes involve only two parties, the lessor and the lessee. Occasionally, as in
Brown v. Young, which was discussed earlier in this Note, the possessory dispute involves three parties, the
original lessor, the lessee, and the purchaser of the reversionary interest. Cases such as Brown may not be
any more difficult to resolve than a Javins dispute. The purchaser and the party in possession will often be
the only vitally interested parties. Only if the purchase agreement terminates because of an inability to
remove the party in possession is the lessor interested in the interim outcome of the possession dispute. But
the mere fact that three parties may be involved in the interim battle does not negate my basic thesis. If
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The interim outcome of title cases can be generalized. Requiring the tenant
to abide by a protective order while maintaining possession best minimizes the
risk of an erroneous interim judgment in most closely contested cases. It does

not necessarily follow from this conclusion, however, that the decision in Bell
v. Tsintolas Realty Co. was totally incorrect. Because serious housing code
violations are easy to prove, even as a preliminary matter, by reference to such
materials as inspection reports and photographs, the probability of a tenant

prevailing on the merits of a Javins defense may be so high that a protective
order requiring payment of the full contractual rent would significantly alter

the risks of loss associated with an erroneous interim decision. The appropriate result, therefore, is somewhere between the Tsintolas decision and current

procedure in most other jurisdictions. At least for cases in which the tenant

raises a Javins defense, the courts should not presume either that a protective

order is inappropriate or that the tenant should deposit the full contractual

rent with the court.11 0 Instead, to minimize the harm from an interim order

that a final order could not redress, the court must make an interim decision
on the probable amount of any rent abatement likely to result from the

proceeding.

CONCLUSION

The recent landlord tenant reform movement has left a remarkable legacy.

Landlord-tenant court is now a significantly different forum for many
contemporary tenants than it was for their nineteenth century counterparts.
The rapidity of these changes, however, has left behind a rigid and untenable
procedural structure incapable of properly applying the substantive reforms.

Courts and legislatures now preoccupied with condominium conversion
moratoria and rent controls should not permit the almost universal accept-

ance of implied warranty theory to obscure the need for further action.
Without change in the procedural form of possession actions, the potential of
Javins and its progeny will remain unfulfilled.
anything, it strengthens it. The interim possessory arrangements in a three party dispute should not be
resolved by reference to the limitations on defenses imposed by rule 5(b) of the Landlord-Tenant Branch of
the District of Columbia Superior Court. The paper chase run by the tenants in Brown, see note 37 supra,
simply confirms the lack of logic in the present system. Rather, the courts should attempt to measure the
potential loss from an erroneous interim decision in determining who should gain possession pending
resolution of the dispute. The likelihood that the purchaser has made financial arrangements for buying the
property significantly complicates the judgment to be made. Nevertheless, attempting to minimize harm
makes much more sense than a knee-jerk reaction to eject the party in possession.
110. In Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co. the court indicated that payment of the full contractual rent should
be the norm when the court imposes a protective order. 430 F.2d at 484. This decision is somewhat
anomalous in light of the court's decision to make it difficult to obtain protective orders. See id. at 482. The
court, however, did give the tenant the right to obtain a reduction in the deposit if he made a "very strong
showing" that the dwelling was in violation of housing regulation norms. Id. at 484. Requiring such a
strong showing conflicts with the proper criteria for granting preliminary relief. Although the burden of
introducing evidence may properly be placed on the tenant, the ultimate inquiry should focus on the
balance between economic considerations and the likelihood of success on the merits. If the potential harm
to a landlord from an erroneous interim decision is nominal, then the tenant's showing on the habitability
claim need not be strong in order to reduce the protective order below contract rent. Such a situation might
arise when the tenant has significant available assets, the landlord holds a substantial security deposit, or
timely collection of rent has been waived by the landlord.

